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It is commonly thought that such topics as Impossibility, Incompleteness, 
Paraconsistency, Undecidability, Randomness, Computability, Paradox, 
Uncertainty and the Limits of Reason are disparate scientific physical or 
mathematical issues having little or nothing in common. I suggest that they are 
largely standard philosophical problems (i.e., language games) which were 
resolved by Wittgenstein over 80 years ago.  
 
Wittgenstein also demonstrated the fatal error in regarding mathematics or 
language or our behavior in general as a unitary coherent logical ‘system,’ rather 
than as a motley of pieces assembled by the random processes of natural 
selection. “Gödel shows us an unclarity in the concept of ‘mathematics’, which is 
indicated by the fact that mathematics is taken to be a system” and we can say 
(contra nearly everyone) that is all that Gödel and Chaitin show. Wittgenstein 
commented many times that ‘truth’ in math means axioms or the theorems 
derived from axioms, and ‘false’ means that one made a mistake in using the 
definitions, and this is utterly different from empirical matters where one applies 
a test. Wittgenstein often noted that to be acceptable as mathematics in the usual 
sense, it must be useable in other proofs and it must have real world applications, 
but neither is the case with Godel’s Incompleteness. Since it cannot be proved in a 
consistent system (here Peano Arithmetic but a much wider arena for Chaitin), it 
cannot be used in proofs and, unlike all the ‘rest’ of PA it cannot be used in the 
real world either. As Rodych notes “…Wittgenstein holds that a formal calculus is 
only a mathematical calculus (i.e., a mathematical language-game) if it has an 
extra- systemic application in a system of contingent propositions (e.g., in 
ordinary counting and measuring or in physics) …” Another way to say this is 
that one needs a warrant to apply our normal use of words like ‘proof’, 
‘proposition’, ‘true’, ‘incomplete’, ‘number’, and ‘mathematics’ to a result in the 





‘Incompleteness’ this warrant is lacking. Rodych sums it up admirably. “On 
Wittgenstein’s account, there is no such thing as an incomplete mathematical 
calculus because ‘in mathematics, everything is algorithm [and syntax] and 
nothing is meaning [semantics]…” 
 
I make some brief remarks which note the similarities of these ‘mathematical’ 
issues to economics, physics, game theory, and decision theory.  
 
Those wishing further comments on philosophy and science from a 
Wittgensteinian two systems of thought viewpoint may consult my other writings 
-- Talking Monkeys--Philosophy, Psychology, Science, Religion and Politics on a 
Doomed Planet--Articles and Reviews 2006-2019 3rd ed (2019), The Logical 
Structure of Philosophy, Psychology, Mind and Language in Ludwig 
Wittgenstein and John Searle 2nd ed (2019), Suicide by Democracy 4th ed (2019), 
The Logical Structure of Human Behavior (2019), The Logical Structure of 
Consciousness (2019, Understanding the Connections between Science, 
Philosophy, Psychology, Religion, Politics, and Economics and Suicidal Utopian 
Delusions in the 21st Century 5th ed (2019), Remarks on Impossibility, 
Incompleteness, Paraconsistency, Undecidability, Randomness, Computability, 
Paradox, Uncertainty and the Limits of Reason in Chaitin, Wittgenstein, 
Hofstadter, Wolpert, Doria, da Costa, Godel, Searle, Rodych, Berto, Floyd, Moyal-
Sharrock and Yanofsky (2019),  and The Logical Structure of Philosophy, 
Psychology, Sociology, Anthropology, Religion, Politics, Economics, Literature 









It is commonly thought that such topics as Impossibility, Incompleteness, 
Paraconsistency, Undecidability, Randomness, Computability, Paradox, 
Uncertainty and the Limits of Reason are disparate scientific physical or 
mathematical issues having little or nothing in common. I suggest that they are 
largely standard philosophical problems (i.e., language games) which were 
resolved by Wittgenstein over 80 years ago.  
 
"Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes and are 
irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This 
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tendency is the real source of metaphysics and leads the philosopher into 
complete darkness."  Wittgenstein  
 
“What we are ‘tempted to say’ in such a case is, of course, not philosophy, but it is 
its raw material. Thus, for example, what a mathematician is inclined to say about 
the objectivity and reality of mathematical facts, is not a philosophy of 
mathematics, but something for philosophical treatment.” Wittgenstein PI 234 
 
One might regard all these issues in many contexts as scientism, i.e., as matters for 
scientific investigation where the facts will provide answers, whereas they can be 
shown to be philosophical matters of how the language is to be used.  
 
“Thus, we may say of some philosophizing mathematicians that they are 
obviously not aware of the many different usages of the word “proof; and that 
they are not clear about the differences between the uses of the word “kind”, 
when they talk of kinds of numbers, kinds of proof, as though the word “kind” 
here meant the same thing as in the context “kinds of apples.” Or, we may say, 
they are not aware of the different meanings of the word “discovery” when in one 
case we talk of the discovery of the construction of the pentagon and in the other 
case of the discovery of the South Pole.” BBB p29 
 
“Ought the word “infinite” to be avoided in mathematics? Yes: where it appears 
to confer a meaning upon the calculus; instead of getting one from it.” RFM 
revised edition (1978) p141 
 
Horwich has nicely summed up the Wittgensteinian view of scientism in these 
contexts. 
  
“There must be no attempt to explain our linguistic/conceptual activity (PI 126) as 
in Frege’s reduction of arithmetic to logic; no attempt to give it epistemological 
foundations (PI 124) as in meaning based accounts of a priori knowledge; no 
attempt to characterize idealized forms of it (PI 130) as in sense logics; no attempt 
to reform it (PI 124, 132) as in Mackie’s error theory or Dummett’s intuitionism; 
no attempt to streamline it (PI 133) as in Quine’s account of existence; no attempt 
to make it more consistent (PI 132) as in Tarski’s response to the liar paradoxes; 
and no attempt to make it more complete (PI 133) as in the settling of questions of 
personal identity for bizarre hypothetical ‘teleportation’ scenarios.” 
 
“The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the 
conflict between it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, of 
course, not a result of investigation: it was a requirement.)” Wittgenstein PI 107 
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Wittgenstein’s remarks on Gödel's famous incompleteness theorems are 
especially notable as they have until recently been almost universally 
misunderstood.  
 
“It might justly be asked what importance Gödel's proof has for our work. For a 
piece of mathematics cannot solve problems of the sort that trouble us. --The 
answer is that the situation, into which such a proof brings us, is of interest to us. 
'What are we to say now?'--That is our theme. However, queer it sounds, my task 
as far as concerns Gödel's proof seems merely to consist in making clear what 
such a proposition as: ‘Suppose this could be proved’ means in mathematics.” 
Wittgenstein “Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics” p337(1956) (written 
in 1937). 
 
Here is one of Gödel's own characterizations of his work. 
 
“My theorems only show that the mechanization of mathematics, i.e., the 
elimination of the mind and of abstract entities, is impossible, if one wants to have 
a satisfactory foundation and system of mathematics. I have not proved that there 
are mathematical questions that are undecidable for the human mind, but only 
that there is no machine (or blind formalism) that can decide all number- theoretic 
questions, (even of a very special kind) .... It is not the structure itself of the 
deductive systems which is being threatened with a brakedown, but only a 
certain interpretation of it, namely its interpretation as a blind formalism.” Gödel 
"Collected Works" Vol 5, p 176-177. (2003) 
 
In my view, it was shown quite convincingly by Wittgenstein in the 1930’s (i.e., 
shortly after Gödel’s proof) that the best way to look at this situation is as a 
typical language game (though a new one for math at the time)—i.e., the “true but 
unprovable” theorems are “true” in a different sense (since they require new 
axioms to prove them). They belong to a different system, or as we ought now to 
say, to a different intentional context. No incompleteness, no loops, no self 
reference and definitely not strange! Wittgenstein: “Gödel's proposition, which 
asserts something about itself, does not mention itself” and “Could it be said: 
Gödel says that one must also be able to trust a mathematical proof when one 
wants to conceive it practically, as the proof that the propositional pattern can be 
constructed according to the rules of proof? Or: a mathematical proposition must 
be capable of being conceived as a proposition of a geometry which is actually 
applicable to itself. And if one does this it comes out that in certain cases it is not 
possible to rely on a proof.” (RFM p336). These remarks barely give a hint at the 
depth of W’s insights into mathematical intentionality, which began with his first 
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writings in 1912 but was most evident in his writings in the 30’s and 40’s. 
Wittgenstein is regarded as a difficult and opaque writer due to his aphoristic, 
telegraphic style and constant jumping about with seldom any notice that he has 
changed topics, nor indeed what the topic is, but if one starts with his only 
textbook style work—the Blue and Brown Books --and understands that he is 
explaining how our evolved higher order thought works, it will all become clear 
to the persistent. 
 
W lectured on these issues in the 1930’s and this has been documented in several 
of his books. There are further comments in German in his nachlass (some of it 
formerly available only on a $1000 cdrom but now, like nearly all his works, on 
p2p torrents, libgen,io and b-ok.org. Canadian philosopher Victor Rodych has 
recently written two articles on Wittgenstein and Gödel in the journal Erkenntnis 
and 4 others on Wittgenstein and math, which I believe constitute a definitive 
summary of Wittgenstein and the foundations of math. He lays to rest the 
previously popular notion that Wittgenstein did not understand incompleteness 
(and much else concerning the psychology of math). In fact, so far as I can see 
Wittgenstein is one of very few to this day who does (and NOT including Gödel! 
—though see his penetrating comment quoted above). Related forms of 
“paradox” which exercise Hofstadter (and countless others) so much was 
extensively discussed by W with examples in math and language and seems to 
me a natural consequence of the piecemeal evolution of our symbolic abilities that 
extends also to music, art, games etc. Those who wish contrary views will find 
them everywhere and regarding Wittgenstein and math, they may consult 
Chihara in Philosophical Review V86, p365-81(1977). I have much respect for 
Chihara (I am one of few who have read his “A Structural Account of 
Mathematics” cover to cover) but he fails on many basic issues, such as 
Wittgenstein’s explanations of paradoxes as unavoidable and almost always 
harmless facets of our EP. 
 
Regarding Godel and “incompleteness”, since our psychology as expressed in 
symbolic systems such as math and language is “random” or “incomplete” and 
full of tasks or situations (“problems”) that have been proven impossible (i.e., 
they have no solution-see below) or whose nature is unclear, it seems unavoidable 
that everything derived from it—e.g. physics and math) will be “incomplete” also. 
I believe the first of these in what is now called Social Choice Theory or Decision 
Theory (which are continuous with the study of logic and reasoning and 
philosophy) was the famous theorem of Kenneth Arrow over 60 years ago, and 
there have been many since. Yanofsky notes a recent impossibility or 
incompleteness proof in two-person game theory. In these cases, a proof shows 
that what looks like a simple choice stated in plain English has no solution. 
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A mountain of literature exists on Gödel's two “incompleteness” theorems and 
Chaitin’s more recent work, but I think that Wittgenstein’s writings in the 30’s 
and 40’s are definitive. Although Shanker, Mancosu, Floyd, Marion, Rodych, 
Gefwert, Wright and others have done insightful work, it is only recently that 
Wittgenstein’s uniquely penetrating analysis of the language games being played 
in mathematics have been clarified by Floyd (e.g., ‘Wittgenstein’s Diagonal 
Argument-a Variation on Cantor and Turing’), Berto (e.g., ‘Godel’s Paradox and 
Wittgenstein’s Reasons , and ‘Wittgenstein on Incompleteness makes 
Paraconsistent Sense’ and the book ‘There’s Something about Godel ‘, and 
Rodych (e.g., Wittgenstein and Godel: the Newly Published Remarks’, 
‘Misunderstanding Gödel :New Arguments about Wittgenstein’, ‘New Remarks 
by Wittgenstein’ and his article in the online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy 
‘Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Mathematics’ ). Berto is one of the best recent 
philosophers, and those with time might wish to consult his many other articles 
and books including the volume he co-edited on paraconsistency (2013). Rodych’s 
work is indispensable, but only two of a dozen or so papers are free online with 
the usual search but of course it’s all free online if one knows where to look (e.g., 
libgen.io and b- ok.org and probably torrents as well). 
 
Berto notes that Wittgenstein also denied the coherence of metamathematics--i.e., 
the use by Gödel of a metatheorem to prove his theorem, likely accounting for his 
“notorious” interpretation of Gödel's theorem as a paradox, and if we accept his 
argument, I think we are forced to deny the intelligibility of metalanguages, 
metatheories and meta anything else. How can it be that such concepts (words) as 
metamathematics and incompleteness, accepted by millions (and even claimed by 
no less than Penrose, Hawking, Dyson et al to reveal fundamental truths about 
our mind or the universe) are just simple misunderstandings about how language 
works? Isn’t the proof in this pudding that, like so many “revelatory” 
philosophical notions (e.g., mind and will as illusions –Dennett, Carruthers, the 
Churchlands etc.), they have no practical impact whatsoever? Berto sums it up 
nicely: “Within this framework, it is not possible that the very same 
sentence…turns out to be expressible, but undecidable, in a formal system… and 
demonstrably true (under the aforementioned consistency 
  
hypothesis) in a different system (the meta-system). If, as Wittgenstein 
maintained, the proof establishes the very meaning of the proved sentence, then it 
is not possible for the same sentence (that is, for a sentence with the same 
meaning) to be undecidable in a formal system, but decided in a different system 
(the meta-system) … Wittgenstein had to reject both the idea that a formal system 
can be syntactically incomplete, and the Platonic consequence that no formal 
system proving only arithmetical truths can prove all arithmetical truths. If proofs 
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establish the meaning of arithmetical sentences, then there cannot be incomplete 
systems, just as there cannot be incomplete meanings.” And further “Inconsistent 
arithmetics, i.e., nonclassical arithmetics based on a paraconsistent logic, are 
nowadays a reality. What is more important, the theoretical features of such 
theories match precisely with some of the aforementioned Wittgensteinian 
intuitions…Their inconsistency allows them also to escape from Gödel's First 
Theorem, and from Church’s undecidability result: they are, that is, demonstrably 
complete and decidable. They therefore fulfil precisely Wittgenstein’s request, 
according to which there cannot be mathematical problems that can be 
meaningfully formulated within the system, but which the rules of the system 
cannot decide. Hence, the decidability of paraconsistent arithmatics harmonizes 
with an opinion Wittgenstein maintained thoughout his philosophical career.” 
 
Wittgenstein also demonstrated the fatal error in regarding mathematics or 
language or our behavior in general as a unitary coherent logical ‘system,’ rather 
than as a motley of pieces assembled by the random processes of natural 
selection. “Gödel shows us an unclarity in the concept of ‘mathematics’, which is 
indicated by the fact that mathematics is taken to be a system” and we can say 
(contra nearly everyone) that is all that Gödel and Chaitin show. Wittgenstein 
commented many times that ‘truth’ in math means axioms or the theorems 
derived from axioms, and ‘false’ means that one made a mistake in using the 
definitions, and this is utterly different from empirical matters where one applies 
a test. Wittgenstein often noted that to be acceptable as mathematics in the usual 
sense, it must be useable in other proofs and it must have real world applications, 
but neither is the case with Godel’s Incompleteness. Since it cannot be proved in a 
consistent system (here Peano Arithmetic but a much wider arena for Chaitin), it 
cannot be used in proofs and, unlike all the ‘rest’ of PA it cannot be used in the 
real world either. As Rodych notes “…Wittgenstein holds that a formal calculus is 
only a mathematical calculus (i.e., a mathematical language-game) if it has an 
extra- systemic application in a system of contingent propositions (e.g., in 
ordinary counting and measuring or in physics) …” Another way to say this is 
that one needs a warrant to apply our normal use of words like ‘proof’, 
‘proposition’, ‘true’, ‘incomplete’, ‘number’, and ‘mathematics’ to a result in the 
tangle of games created with ‘numbers’ and ‘plus’ and ‘minus’ signs etc., and 
with 
  
‘Incompleteness’ this warrant is lacking. Rodych sums it up admirably. “On 
Wittgenstein’s account, there is no such thing as an incomplete mathematical 
calculus because ‘in mathematics, everything is algorithm [and syntax] and 




Wittgenstein has much the same to say of Cantor’s diagonalization and set theory. 
“Consideration of the diagonal procedure shews you that the concept of ‘real 
number’ has much less analogy with the concept ‘cardinal number’ than we, 
being misled by certain analogies, are inclined to believe” and many other 
comments (see Rodych and Floyd). 
 
In any case, it would seem that the fact that Gödel’s result has had zero impact on 
math (except to stop people from trying to prove completeness!) should have 
alerted Hofstadter to its triviality and the “strangeness” of trying to make it a 
basis for anything. I suggest that it be regarded as another conceptual game that 
shows us the boundaries of our psychology. Of course, all of math, physics, and 
human behavior can usefully be taken this way. 
 
 
By far the most famous (or notorious I would say) remarks on Gödel are those by 
Douglas Hofstadter in  his book  Gödel, Escher, Bach: the eternal  golden Braid  
which was subsequently disussed in his  book I am a Strange Loop.    
 
Regarding Gödel’s famous theorems, in what sense can they be loops? What they 
are almost universally supposed to show is that certain basic kinds of 
mathematical systems are incomplete in the sense that there are “true” theorems 
of the system whose “truth” (the unfortunate word mathematicians commonly 
substitute for validity) or “falsity (invalidity) cannot be proven in the system. 
Though Hofstadter does not tell you, these theorems are logically equivalent to 
Turing’s “incompleteness” solution of the famous halting problem for computers 
performing some arbitrary calculation. He spends a lot of time explaining Gödel’s 
original proof, but fails to mention that others subsequently found vastly shorter 
and simpler proofs of “incompleteness” in math and proved many related 
concepts. The one he does briefly mention is that of contemporary mathematician 
Gregory Chaitin—an originator with Kolmogorov and others of Algorithmic 
Information Theory-- who has shown that such “incompleteness” or 
“randomness” (Chaitin’s term-- though this is another game), is much more 
extensive than long thought, but does not tell you that both Gödel’s and Turing’s 
results are corollaries to Chaitin’s theorem and an instance of “algorithmic 
randomness”. You should refer to Chaitin’s more recent writings such as “The 
Omega Number (2005)”, as Hofstadter’s only ref. to Chaitin is 20 years old 
(though Chaitin has no more grasp of the larger issues here –i.e., innate 
intentionality as the source of the language games in math-- than does H and 
shares the ‘Universe is a Computer” fantasy as well). 
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Hofstadter takes this “incompleteness” – a language game out of context - to 
mean that the system is self referential or “loopy” and “strange”. It is not made 
clear why having theorems that seem to be (or are) true (i.e., valid) in the system, 
but not provable in it, makes it a loop nor why this qualifies as strange nor why 
this has any relationship to  
anything else. 
 
Hofstadter, in all his writings, follows the common trend and makes much of 
“paradoxes”, which he regards as self references, recursions or loops, but there 
are many “inconsistencies” in intentional psychology (math, language, 
perception, art etc.) and they have no effect, as our psychology evolved to ignore 
them. Thus, “paradoxes” such as “this sentence is false” only tell us that “this” 
does not refer to itself or if you prefer that this is one of infinitely many 
arrangements of words lacking a clear sense. Any symbolic system we have (i.e., 
language, math, art, music, games etc.) will always have areas of conflict, 
insoluble or counterintuitive problems or unclear definitions. Hence, we have 
Gödel’s theorems, the liar’s paradox, inconsistencies in set theory, prisoner’s 
dilemmas, Schrodinger’s dead/live cat, Newcomb’s problem, Anthropic 
principles, Bayesian statistics, notes you can’t sound together or colors you can’t 
mix together and rules that can’t be used in the same game. A set of subindustries 
within Decision Theory, Behavioral Economics, Game Theory, Philosophy, 
Psychology and Sociology, Law, Political Science etc. and even the Foundations of 
Physics and Math (where it is commonly disguised as Philosophy of Science) has 
arisen which deals with endless variations on “real” (e.g., quantum mechanics) or 
contrived ((e.g., Newcomb’s problem—see Analysis V64, p187- 89(2004)) 
situations where our psychology –evolved only to get food, find mates and avoid 
becoming lunch—gives ambivalent results, or just breaks down. 
 
 
In the recent book ‘Gödel's Way’ three eminent scientists discuss issues such as 
undecidability, incompleteness, randomness, computability and paraconsistency. 
I approach these issues from the Wittgensteinian viewpoint that there are two 
basic issues which have completely different solutions. There are the scientific or 
empirical issues, which are facts about the world that need to be investigated 
observationally and philosophical issues as to how language can be used 
intelligibly (which include certain questions in mathematics and logic), which 
need to be decided by looking at how we actually use words in particular 
contexts. When we get clear about which language game we are playing, these 
topics are seen to be ordinary scientific and mathematical questions like any 
others. Wittgenstein’s insights have seldom been equaled and never surpassed 
and are as pertinent today as they were 80 years ago when he dictated the Blue 
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and Brown Books. In spite of its failings—really a series of notes rather than a 
finished book—this is a unique source of the work of these three famous scholars 
who have been working at the bleeding edges of physics, math and philosophy 
for over half a century. Da Costa and Doria are cited by Wolpert (see below or my 
articles on Wolpert and my review of Yanofsky’s ‘The Outer Limits of Reason’) 
since they wrote on universal computation, and among his many 
accomplishments, Da Costa is a pioneer in paraconsistency. 
 
Chaitin’s proof of the algorithmic randomness of math (of which Gödel's results 
are a corollary) and the Omega number are some of the most famous 
mathematical results in the last 50 years and he has documented them in many 
books and articles. His coauthors from Brazil are less well known in spite of their 
many important contributions. For all the topics here, the best way to get free 
articles and books on the cutting edge is to visit ArXiv.org, viXra.org, 
academia.edu, citeseerx.ist.psu.edu, philpapers.org, researchgate.net, libgen.io or 
b-ok.org etc., where there are millions of preprints/articles/books on every topic 
(be warned this may use up all your spare time for the rest of your life!). 
 
Chaitin is an American and his many books and articles are well known and easy 
to find, but Da Costa (who is over 90) and Doria (over 80) are Brazilians and most 
of Da Costa’s work is only in Portuguese, but Doria has many items in English. 
You can find a partial bibliography for Doria here 
http://www.math.buffalo.edu/mad/PEEPS2/doria_franciscoA.html and of course 
see their Wikis. 
 
The best collections of their work are in Chaos, Computers, Games and Time: A 
quarter century of joint work with Newton da Costa by F. Doria 132p(2011), On 
the Foundations of Science by da Costa and Doria 294p(2008), and 
Metamathematics of science by da Costa and Doria 216p(1997), but they were 
published in Brazil and almost impossible to find. You will likely have to get 
them through interlibrary loan or as digital files from the authors, but as always 
try libgen.io and b-ok.org. 
 
There is a nice Festschrift in honor of Newton C.A. Da Costa on the occasion of 
his seventieth birthday edited by Décio Krause, Steven French, Francisco 
  
Antonio Doria. (2000) which is an issue of Synthese (Dordrecht). Vol. 125, no. 1- 2 
(2000), also published as a book, but the book is in only 5 libraries worldwide and 
not on Amazon. 
 
See also Doria (Ed.), "The Limits Of Mathematical Modeling In The Social 
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Sciences: The Significance Of Gödel's Incompleteness Phenomenon" (2017) and 
Wuppuluri and Doria (Eds.), "The Map and the Territory: Exploring the 
foundations of science, thought and reality" (2018). 
 
Another relevant item is New trends in the foundations of science : papers 
dedicated to the 80th birthday of Patrick Suppes, presented in Florianópolis, 
Brazil, April 22-23, 2002 by Jean-Yves Beziau; Décio Krause; Otávio Bueno; 
Newton C da Costa; Francisco Antonio Doria; Patrick Suppes; (2007), which is 
vol. 154 # 3 of Synthese, but again the book is in only 2 libraries and not on 
Amazon. 
 
Brazilian studies in philosophy and history of science: an account of recent works 
by Decio Krause; Antônio Augusto Passos Videira; has one article by each of them 
and is an expensive book but cheap on Kindle. Though it is a decade old, some 
may be interested in “Are the Foundations of Computer Science Logic-
dependent?” by Carnielli and Doria, which says that Turing Machine Theory 
(TMT) can be seen as ‘arithmetic in disguise’, in particular as the theory of 
Diophantine Equations in which they formalize it, and conclude that 
‘Axiomatized Computer Science is Logic-Dependent’. Of course, as 
Wittgensteinians, we want to look very carefully at the language games (or math 
games), i.e., the precise Conditions of Satisfaction (truthmakers) resulting from 
using each of these words (i.e., ‘axiomatized’, ‘computer science’, and ‘logic- 
dependent’). Carnielli and Agudello also formalize TMT in terms of 
paraconsistent logic, creating a model for paraconsistent Turing Machines 
(PTM’s) which has similarities to quantum computing and so with a quantic 
interpretation of it they create a Quantum Turing Machine model with which they 
solve the Deutsch and Deutsch-Jozsa problems. 
 
This permits contradictory instructions to be simultaneously executed and stored 
and each tape cell, when and if halting occurs, may have multiple symbols, each 
of which represents an output, thus permitting control of unicity versus 
multiplicity conditions, which simulate quantum algorithms, preserving 
efficiency. 
 
Doria and Da Costa also proved (1991) that chaos theory is undecidable, and 
when properly axiomatized within classical set theory, is incomplete in Gödel’s 
sense. 
  
The articles, and especially the group discussion with Chaitin, Fredkin, Wolfram 
et al at the end of Zenil H. (ed.) ‘Randomness through computation’ (2011) is a 
stimulating continuation of many of the topics here, but again lacking awareness 
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of the philosophical issues, and so often missing the point. Chaitin also 
contributes to ‘Causality, Meaningful Complexity and Embodied Cognition’ 
(2010), replete with articles having the usual mixture of scientific insight and 
philosophical incoherence, and as usual nobody is aware that Wittgenstein 
provided deep and unsurpassed insights into the issues over half a century ago, 
including Embodied Cognition (Enactivism). 
 
 
Since Gödel's theorems are corollaries of Chaitin’s theorem showing algorithmic 
randomness (incompleteness) throughout math (which is just another of our 
symbolic systems that may result in public testable actions-i.e., if meaningful it 
has COS), it seems inescapable that thinking (dispositional 
  
behavior having COS) is full of impossible, random or incomplete statements and 
situations. Since we can view each of these domains as symbolic systems evolved 
by chance to make our psychology work, perhaps it should be regarded as 
unsurprising that they are not “complete”. For math, Chaitin says this 
‘randomness’ (another group of language games) shows there are limitless 
theorems that are ‘true’ but unprovable—i.e., ‘true’ for no ‘reason’. One should 
then be able to say that there are limitless statements that make perfect 
“grammatical” sense that do not describe actual situations attainable in that 
domain. I suggest these puzzles go away if one considers Wittgenstein’s views. 
He wrote many notes on the issue of Godel’s Theorems, and the whole of his 
work concerns the plasticity, “incompleteness” and extreme context sensitivity of 
language, math and logic, and the recent papers of Rodych, Floyd and Berto are 
the best introduction I know of to Wittgenstein’s remarks on the foundations of 
mathematics and so to philosophy. 
 
Regarding Gödel and “incompleteness”, since our psychology as expressed in 
symbolic systems such as math and language is “random” or “incomplete” and 
full of tasks or situations (“problems”) that have been proven impossible (i.e., 
they have no solution-see below) or whose nature is unclear, it seems unavoidable 
that everything derived from it by using higher order thought (system 2 or S2) to 
extend our innate axiomatic psychology (System 1 or S1) into complex social 
interactions such as games, economics, physics and math, will be “incomplete” 
also. 
 
The first of these in what is now called Social Choice Theory or Decision Theory 
(which are continuous with the study of logic and reasoning and philosophy) was 
the famous theorem of Kenneth Arrow 63 years ago, and there have been many 
since such as the recent impossibility or incompleteness proof by Brandenburger 
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and Kreisel (2006) in two-person game theory. In these cases, a proof shows that 
what looks like a simple choice stated in plain English has no solution. There are 
also many famous “paradoxes” such as Sleeping Beauty (dissolved by Rupert 
Read), Newcomb’s problem (dissolved by Wolpert) and Doomsday, where what 
seems to be a very simple problem either has no one clear answer, or it proves 
exceptionally hard to find. A mountain of literature exists on Godel’s two 
“incompleteness” theorems and Chaitin’s more recent work, but I think that W’s 
writings in the 30’s and 40’s are definitive. Although Shanker, Mancosu, Floyd, 
Marion, Rodych, Gefwert, Wright and others have done insightful work in 
explaining W, it is only recently that W’s uniquely penetrating analysis of the 
language games being played in mathematics and logic have been clarified by 
Floyd (e.g., ‘Wittgenstein’s Diagonal Argument-a Variation on Cantor and 
Turing’), Berto (e.g., ‘Godel’s Paradox and Wittgenstein’s Reasons’ , and 
‘Wittgenstein on Incompleteness makes 
  
Paraconsistent Sense’, and Rodych (e.g., ‘Wittgenstein and Godel’s: the Newly 
Published Remarks’ and ‘Misunderstanding Gödel :New Arguments about 
Wittgenstein and New Remarks by Wittgenstein’). Berto is one of the best recent 
philosophers, and those with time might wish to consult his many other articles 
and books including the volume he co- edited on paraconsistency. Rodych’s work 
is indispensable, but only two of a dozen or so papers are free online (but see b-
ok.org and also his online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy articles). 
  
Wittgenstein also demonstrated the fatal error in regarding mathematics or 
language or our behavior in general as a unitary coherent logical ‘system,’ rather 
than as a motley of pieces assembled by the random processes of natural 
selection. “Godel shows us an unclarity in the concept of ‘mathematics’, which is 
indicated by the fact that mathematics is taken to be a system” and we can say 
(contra nearly everyone) that is all that Godel and Chaitin show. Wittgenstein 
commented many times that ‘truth’ in math means axioms or the theorems 
derived from axioms, and ‘false’ means that one made a mistake in using the 
definitions (from which results follow necessarily and algorithmically), and this is 
utterly different from empirical matters where one applies a test (the results of 
which are unpredictable and debatable). Wittgenstein often noted that to be 
acceptable as mathematics in the usual sense, it must be useable in other proofs 
and it must have real world applications, but neither is the case with Godel’s 
Incompleteness. Since it cannot be proved in a consistent system (here Peano 
Arithmetic but a much wider arena for Chaitin), it cannot be used in proofs and, 
unlike all the ‘rest’ of Peano Arithmetic, it cannot be used in the real world either. 
As Rodych notes “…Wittgenstein holds that a formal calculus is only a 
mathematical calculus (i.e., a mathematical language-game) if it has an extra- 
14  
systemic application in a system of contingent propositions (e.g., in ordinary 
counting and measuring or in physics) …” Another way to say this is that one 
needs a warrant to apply our normal use of words like ‘proof’, ‘proposition’, 
‘true’, ‘incomplete’, ‘number’, and ‘mathematics’ to a result in the tangle of games 
created with ‘numbers’ and ‘plus’ and ‘minus’ signs etc., and with 
‘Incompleteness’ this warrant is lacking. Rodych sums it up admirably. “On 
Wittgenstein’s account, there is no such thing as an incomplete mathematical 
calculus because ‘in mathematics, everything is algorithm [and syntax] and 
nothing is meaning [semantics]…” 
 
W has much the same to say of Cantor’s diagonalization and set theory. 
“Consideration of the diagonal procedure shews you that the concept of ‘real 
number’ has much less analogy with the concept ‘cardinal number’ than we, 
being misled by certain analogies, are inclined to believe” and makes many other 
penetrating comments (see Rodych and Floyd). Of course, the same remarks 
apply to all forms of logic and any other symbolic system. 
 
As Rodych, Berto and Priest (another pioneer in paraconsistency) have noted, W 
was the first (by several decades) to insist on the unavoidability and utility of 
inconsistency (and debated this issue with Turing during his classes on the 
Foundations of Mathematics). We now see that the disparaging comments about 
Wittgenstein’s remarks on math made by Godel, Kreisel, Dummett and many 
others were misconceived. As usual, it is a very bad idea to bet against 
Wittgenstein. Some may feel we have strayed off the path here—after all in 
‘Godel’s Way’ we only want to understand ‘science’ and ‘mathematics’ (in quotes 
because part of the problem is regarding them as ‘systems’) and why these 
‘paradoxes’ and ‘inconsistencies’ arise and how to dispose of them. But I claim 
that is exactly what I have done by pointing to the work of W. Our symbolic 
systems (language, math, logic, computation) have a clear use in the narrow 
confines of everyday life, in what we can loosely call the mesoscopic realm--the 
space and time of normal events we can observe unaided and with certainty (the 
innate axiomatic bedrock or background as Wittgenstein and later Searle call it). 
But we leave coherence behind when we enter the realms of particle physics or 
the cosmos, relativity, math beyond simple addition and subtraction with whole 
numbers, and language used out of the immediate context of everyday events. 
The words or whole sentences may be the same, but the meaning is lost (i.e., to 
use Searle’s preferred term, their Conditions of Satisfaction (COS) are changed or 
opaque). It looks to me like the best way to understand philosophy may be to 
enter it via Berto, Rodych and Floyd’s work on Wittgenstein, so as to understand 
the subtleties of language as it is used in math and thereafter “metaphysical” 
issues of all kinds may be dissolved. As Floyd notes “In a sense, Wittgenstein is 
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literalizing Turing’s model, bringing it back down to the everyday and drawing 
out the anthropomorphic command- aspect of Turing’s metaphors.” 
 
 
As Wittgenstein noted, most of what people (including many philosophers and 
most scientists) have to say when philosophizing is not philosophy but its raw 
material. Chaitin, Doria, and Da Costa join Yanofsky, Hume, Quine, Dummett, 
Kripke, Dennett, Churchland, Carruthers, Wheeler etc. in repeating the mistakes 
of the Greeks with elegant philosophical jargon mixed with science. I suggest 
quick antidotes via my reviews and some Rupert Read such as his books ‘A 
Wittgensteinian Way with Paradoxes’ and ‘Wittgenstein Among the Sciences’, or 
go to academia.edu and get his articles , especially ‘Kripke’s Conjuring Trick’ and 
‘Against Time Slices’ and then as much of Searle as feasible, but at least his most 
recent such as ‘Philosophy in a New Century’, ‘Searle’s Philosophy and Chinese 
Philosophy’, ‘Making the Social World’ and ‘Thinking About the Real World’ (or 
at least my reviews) and his recent volume on perception. There are also over 100 
YouTubes of Searle, which confirm his reputation as the best standup philosopher 
since Wittgenstein. 
 
A major overlap that now exists (and is expanding rapidly) between game 
theorists, physicists, economists, mathematicians, philosophers, decision theorists 
and others, all of whom have been publishing for decades closely related proofs 
of undecidability, impossibility, uncomputability, and incompleteness. One of the 
more bizarre is the recent proof by Armando Assis that in the relative state 
formulation of quantum mechanics one can setup a zero-sum game between the 
universe and an observer using the Nash Equilibrium, from which follow the 
Born rule and the collapse of the wave function. Godel was first to demonstrate 
an impossibility result and (until Chaitin and above all Wolpert— see my article 
on his work) it is the most far reaching (or just trivial/incoherent), but there have 
been an avalanche of others. As noted, one of the earliest in decision theory was 
the famous General Impossibility Theorem (GIT) discovered by Kenneth Arrow 
in 1951 (for which he got the Nobel Prize in economics in 1972—and five of his 
students are now Nobel laureates so this is not fringe science). It states roughly 
that no reasonably consistent and fair voting system (i.e., no method of 
aggregating individuals’ preferences into group preferences) can give sensible 
results. The group is either dominated by one person and so GIT is often called 
the “dictator theorem”, or there are intransitive preferences. Arrow’s original 
paper was titled "A Difficulty in the Concept of Social Welfare" and can be stated 
like this:” It is impossible to formulate a social preference ordering that satisfies 
all of the following conditions: Nondictatorship; Individual Sovereignty; 
Unanimity; Freedom From Irrelevant Alternatives; Uniqueness of Group Rank.” 
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Those familiar with modern decision theory accept this and the many related 
  
constraining theorems as their starting points. Those who are not may find it (and 
all these theorems) incredible and in that case, they need to find a career path that 
has nothing to do with any of the above disciplines. See  ”The Arrow 
Impossibility Theorem”(2014) or “Decision Making and Imperfection”(2013) 
among legions of publications. 
 
 
Another recent famous impossibility result is that of Brandenburger and Keisler 
(2006) for two person games (but of course not limited to “games” and like all 
these impossibility results it applies broadly to decisions of any kind), which 
shows that any belief model of a certain kind leads to contradictions. One 
interpretation of the result is that if the decision analyst’s tools (basically just 
logic) are available to the players in a game, then there are statements or beliefs 
that the players can write down or ‘think about’ but cannot actually hold. But 
note Wittgenstein’s characterization of ‘thinking’ as a potential action with COS, 
which says they don’t really have a meaning (use), like Chaitin’s infinity of 
apparently well-formed formulas that do not actually belong to our system of 
mathematics. “Ann believes that Bob assumes that Ann believes that Bob’s 
assumption is wrong” seems unexceptionable and multiple layers of ‘recursion’ 
(another LG) have been assumed in argumentation, linguistics, philosophy etc., 
for a century at least, but B&K showed that it is impossible for Ann and Bob to 
assume these beliefs. And there is a rapidly growing body of such impossibility 
results for one person or multiplayer decision situations (e.g., they grade into 
Arrow, Wolpert, Koppel and Rosser etc.). For a good technical paper from among 
the avalanche on the B&K paradox, get Abramsky and Zvesper’s paper from 
arXiv which takes us back to the liar paradox and Cantor’s infinity (as its title 
notes it is about “interactive forms of diagonalization and self-reference”) and 
thus to Floyd, Rodych, Berto, W and Godel. Many of these papers quote 
Yanofsky’s  paper “A universal approach to self- referential paradoxes and fixed 
points. Bulletin of Symbolic Logic, 9(3):362–386,2003. 
 
Abramsky (a polymath who is among other things a pioneer in quantum 
computing) is a friend of Y’s and so Y contributes a paper to the recent Festschrift 
to him ‘Computation, Logic, Games and Quantum Foundations’(2013). For maybe 
the best recent (2013) commentary on the BK and related paradoxes see the 165p 
powerpoint lecture free on the net by Wes Holliday and Eric Pacuit ’Ten Puzzles 
and Paradoxes about Knowledge and Belief’. For a good multi-author survey see 
’Collective Decision Making (2010). 
 
17  
One of the major omissions from all such books is the amazing work of polymath 
physicist and decision theorist David Wolpert, who proved some stunning 
impossibility or incompleteness theorems (1992 to 2008-see arxiv.org) on the   
limits   to   inference (computation)  that   are   so   general  they  are 
  
independent of the device doing the computation, and even independent of the 
laws of physics, so they apply across computers, physics, and human behavior, 
which he summarized thusly: “One cannot build a physical computer that can be 
assured of correctly processing information faster than the universe does. The 
results also mean that there cannot exist an infallible, general-purpose 
observation apparatus, and that there cannot be an infallible, general-purpose 
control apparatus. These results do not rely on systems that are inﬁnite, and/or 
non-classical, and/or obey chaotic dynamics. They also hold even if one uses an 
inﬁnitely fast, inﬁnitely dense computer, with computational powers greater than 
that of a Turing Machine.” He also published what seems to be the first serious 
work on team or collective intelligence (COIN) which he says puts this subject on 
a sound scientific footing. Although he has published various versions of these 
proofs over two decades in some of the most prestigious peer reviewed physics 
journals (e.g., Physica D 237: 257-81(2008)) as well as in NASA journals and has 
gotten news items in major science journals, few seem to have noticed, and I have 
looked in dozens of recent books on physics, math, decision theory and 
computation without finding a reference. 
 
Wittgenstein’s prescient grasp of these issues, including his embrace of strict 
finitism and paraconsistency, is finally spreading through math, logic and 
computer science (though rarely with any acknowledgement). Bremer has 
recently suggested the necessity of a Paraconsistent Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem. 
“Any mathematical theory presented in first order logic has a finite 
paraconsistent model.” Berto continues: “Of course strict finitism and the 
insistence on the decidability of any meaningful mathematical question go hand 
in hand. As Rodych has remarked, the intermediate Wittgenstein’s view is 
dominated by his ‘finitism and his view […] of mathematical meaningfulness as 
algorithmic decidability’ according to which ‘[only] finite logical sums and 
products (containing only decidable arithmetic predicates) are meaningful 
because they are algorithmically decidable.’”. In modern terms this means they 
have public conditions of satisfaction (COS)-i.e., can be stated as a proposition 
that is true or false. And this brings us to W’s view that ultimately everything in 
math and logic rests on our innate (though of course extensible) ability to 
recognize a valid proof. Berto again: “Wittgenstein believed that the naïve (i.e., 
the working mathematician’s) notion of proof had to be decidable, for lack of 
decidability meant to him simply lack of mathematical meaning: Wittgenstein 
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believed that everything had to be decidable in mathematics…Of course one can 
speak against the decidability of the naïve notion of truth on the basis of Godel’s 
results themselves. But one may argue that, in the context, this would beg the 
question against paraconsistentists-- and against Wittgenstein too. Both 
Wittgenstein and the paraconsistentists on one side, and the followers of the 
standard view on the other, agree on the following thesis: the decidability of the 
notion of proof and 
  
its inconsistency are incompatible. But to infer from this that the naïve notion of 
proof is not decidable invokes the indispensability of consistency, which is exactly 
what Wittgenstein and the paraconsistent argument call into question...for as 
Victor Rodych has forcefully argued, the consistency of the relevant system is 
precisely what is called into question by Wittgenstein’s reasoning.” And so: 
“Therefore the Inconsistent arithmetic avoids Godel’s First Incompleteness 
Theorem. It also avoids the Second Theorem in the sense that its non-triviality can 
be established within the theory: and Tarski’s Theorem too—including its own 
predicate is not a problem for an inconsistent theory” [As Graham Priest noted 
over 20 years ago]. 
 
This again brings to mind Wittgenstein’s famous comment. 
 
“What we are ‘tempted to say’ in such a case is, of course, not philosophy, but it is 
its raw material. Thus, for example, what a mathematician is inclined to say about 
the objectivity and reality of mathematical facts, is not a philosophy of 
mathematics, but something for philosophical treatment.” PI 234 
 
And again, ‘decidability’ comes down to the ability to recognize a valid proof, 
which rests on our innate axiomatic psychology, which math and logic have in 
common with language. And this is not just a remote historical issue but is totally 
current. I have read much of Chaitin and never seen a hint that he has considered 
these matters. 
 
Again the work of Douglas Hofstadter also comes to mind. His Godel, Escher, 
Bach won a Pulitzer prize and a National Book Award for Science, sold millions 
of copies and continues to get good reviews (e.g. almost 400 mostly 5 star reviews 
on Amazon to date) but he has no clue about the real issues and repeats the 
classical philosophical mistakes on nearly every page. His subsequent 
philosophical writings have not improved (he has chosen Dennett as his muse), 




Once again note that “infinite”, “compute”, “information” etc., only have 
meaning in specific human contexts— that is, as Searle has emphasized, they are 
all observer relative or ascribed vs intrinsically intentional. The universe apart 
from our psychology is neither finite nor infinite and cannot compute nor process 
anything. Only in our language games do our laptop or the universe compute. 
 
Yanofsky’s book (The Outer Limits of Reason) is an extended treatment of these 
issues, but with little philosophical insight. He says math is free of contradictions, 
yet as noted, it has been well known for over half a century that logic and math 
are full of them—just google inconsistency in math or search it on Amazon or see 
the works of Priest, Berto or the article by Weber in the Internet Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy. W was the first to predict inconsistency or paraconsistency, and if we 
follow Berto we can interpret this as Wittgenstein’s suggestion to avoid 
incompleteness. In any event, paraconsistency is now a common feature and a 
major research program in geometry, set theory, arithmetic, analysis, logic and 
computer science. Yanofsky on p346 says reason must be free of contradictions, 
but it is clear that “free of” has different uses and they arise frequently in 
everyday life, but we have innate mechanisms to contain them. This is true 
because it was the case in our everyday life long before math and science. Until 
very recently only Wittgenstein saw that it was unavoidable that our life and all 
our symbolic systems are paraconsistent and that we get along just fine as we 
have mechanisms for encapsulating or avoiding it. Wittgenstein tried to explain 
this to Turing in his lectures on the foundations of mathematics, given at 
Cambridge at the same time as Turing’s course on the same topic. 
 
Now I will make a few comments on specific items in Yanofsky’s book. As noted 
on p13, Rice’s Theorem shows the impossibility of a universal antivirus for 
computers (and perhaps for living organisms as well) and so is, like Turing’s 
Halting theorem, another alternative statement of Godel’s Theorems, but unlike 
Turing’s, it is rarely mentioned. 
 
On p33 the discussion of the relation of compressibility, structure, randomness 
etc. is much better stated in Chaitin’s many other books and papers. Also of 
fundamental importance is the comment by Weyl on the fact that one can ‘prove’ 
or ‘derive’ anything from anything else if one permits arbitrarily ‘complex’ 
‘equations’ (with arbitrary ‘constants’) but there is little awareness of this among 
scientists or philosophers. As W said we need to look at the role which any 
statement, equation, logical or mathematical proof plays in our life in order to 
discern its meaning since there is no limit on what we can write, say or ‘prove’, 
but only a tiny subset of these has a use. ‘Chaos’, ‘complexity’, ‘law’, ‘structure’, 
‘theorem’, ‘equation’, ‘proof’, ‘result’, ‘randomness’, ‘compressibility’ etc. are all 
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families of language games with meanings (COS) that vary greatly, and one must 
look at their precise role in the given context. 
 
Likewise, on p54 et seq. it was Wittgenstein who has given us the first and best 
rationale for paraconsistency, long before anyone actually worked out a 
paraconsistent logic. Again, as W pointed out many times, it is critical to be aware 
that not everything is a ‘problem’, ‘question’, ‘answer’, ‘proof’ or a ‘solution’ in 
the same sense and accepting something as one or the other commits one to an 
often confused point of view. 
 
In the discussion of physics on p108-9 we must remind ourselves that ‘point’, 
‘energy’, ‘space’, ‘time’, ‘infinite’, ‘beginning’, ‘end’, ‘particle’, ’wave’, ‘quantum’ 
etc. are all typical language games that seduce us into incoherent views of how 
things are by applying meanings (COS) from one game to a quite different one.  
 
I have read many recent discussions of the limits of computation and the universe 
as computer, hoping to find some comments on the amazing work of polymath 
physicist and decision theorist David Wolpert but have not found a single citation 
and so I present this very brief summary. Wolpert proved some stunning 
impossibility or incompleteness theorems (1992 to 2008-see arxiv.org) on the 
limits to inference (computation) that are so general they are independent of the 
device doing the computation, and even independent of the laws of physics, so 
they apply across computers, physics, and human behavior. They make use of 
Cantor's diagonalization, the liar paradox and worldlines to provide what may be 
the ultimate theorem in Turing Machine Theory, and seemingly provide insights 
into impossibility, incompleteness, the limits of computation, and the universe as 
computer, in all possible universes and all beings or mechanisms, generating, 
among other things, a non- quantum mechanical uncertainty principle and a 
proof of monotheism. There are obvious connections to the classic work of 
Chaitin, Solomonoff, Komolgarov and Wittgenstein and to the notion that no 
program (and thus no device) can generate a sequence (or device) with greater 
complexity than it possesses. One might say this body of work implies atheism 
since there cannot be any entity more complex than the physical universe and 
from the Wittgensteinian viewpoint, ‘more complex’ is meaningless (has no 
conditions of satisfaction, i.e., truth-maker or test). Even a ‘God’ (i.e., a 
‘device’with limitless time/space and energy) cannot determine whether a given 
‘number’ is ‘random’, nor find a certain way to show that a given ‘formula’, 
‘theorem’ or ‘sentence’ or ‘device’ (all these being complex language games) is 




I have read many recent discussions of the limits of computation and the universe 
as computer, hoping to find some comments on the amazing work of polymath 
physicist and decision theorist David Wolpert but have not found a single citation 
and so I present this very brief article. Wolpert proved some stunning 
impossibility or incompleteness theorems (1992 to 2008-see arxiv.org) on the 
limits to inference (computation) that are so general they are independent of the 
device doing the computation, and even independent of the laws of physics, so 
they apply across computers, physics, and human behavior, which he 
summarized thusly: “One cannot build a physical computer that can be assured of 
correctly processing information faster than the universe does. The results also 
mean that there cannot exist an infallible, general-purpose observation apparatus, 
and that there cannot be an infallible, general-purpose control apparatus. These 
results do not rely on systems that are inﬁnite, and/or non-classical, and/or obey 
chaotic dynamics. They also hold even if one uses an inﬁnitely fast, inﬁnitely 
dense computer, with computational powers greater than that of a Turing 
Machine.” He also published what seems to be the first serious work on team or 
collective intelligence (COIN) which he says puts this subject on a sound scientific 
footing. Although he has published various versions of these over two decades in 
some of the most prestigious peer reviewed physics journals (e.g., Physica D 237: 
257-81(2008)) as well as in NASA journals and has gotten news items in major 
science journals, few seem to have noticed and I have looked in dozens of recent 
books on physics, math, decision theory and computation without finding a 
reference. 
 
It is most unfortunate that almost nobody is aware of Wolpert, since his work can 
be seen as the ultimate extension of computing, thinking, inference, 
incompleteness, and undecidability, which he achieves (like many proofs in 
Turing machine theory) by extending the liar paradox and Cantors 
diagonalization to include all possible universes and all beings or mechanisms 
and thus may be seen as the last word not only on computation, but on 
cosmology or even deities. He achieves this extreme generality by partitioning the 
inferring universe using worldlines (i.e., in terms of what it does and not how it 
does it) so that his mathematical proofs are independent of any particular 
physical laws or computational structures in establishing the physical limits of 
inference for past, present and future and all possible calculation, observation and 
control. He notes that even in a classical universe Laplace was wrong about being 
able to perfectly predict the future (or even perfectly depict the past or present) 
and that his impossibility results can be viewed as a “non-quantum 
  
mechanical uncertainty principle” (i.e., there cannot be an infallible observation or 
control device). Any universal physical device must be infinite, it can only be so at 
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one moment in time, and no reality can have more than one (the “monotheism 
theorem”). Since space and time do not appear in the definition, the device can 
even be the entire universe across all time. It can be viewed as a physical analog 
of incompleteness with two inference devices rather than one self-referential 
device. As he says, “either the Hamiltonian of our universe proscribes a certain 
type of computation, or prediction complexity is unique (unlike algorithmic 
information complexity) in that there is one and only one version of it that can be 
applicable throughout our universe.” Another way to say this is that one cannot 
have two physical inference devices (computers) both capable of being asked 
arbitrary questions about the output of the other, or that the universe cannot 
contain a computer to which one can pose any arbitrary computational task, or 
that for any pair of physical inference engines, there are always binary valued 
questions about the state of the universe that cannot even be posed to at least one 
of them. One cannot build a computer that can predict an arbitrary future 
condition of a physical system before it occurs, even if the condition is from a 
restricted set of tasks that can be posed to it— that is, it cannot process 
information (though this is a vexed phrase, as many including John Searle and 
Rupert Read note) faster than the universe. 
 
The computer and the arbitrary physical system it is computing do not have to be 
physically coupled and it holds regardless of the laws of physics, chaos, quantum 
mechanics, causality or light cones and even for an infinite speed of light. The 
inference device does not have to be spatially localized but can be nonlocal 
dynamical processes occurring across the entire universe. He is well aware that 
this puts the speculations of Wolfram, Landauer, Fredkin, Lloyd etc., concerning 
the universe as computer or the limits of ”information processing”, in a new light 
(though the indices of their writings make no reference to him and another 
remarkable omission is that none of the above are mentioned by Yanofsky in his 
recent comprehensive book ‘The Outer Limits of Reason’ (see my review). 
Wolpert says he shows that ‘the universe’ cannot contain an inference device that 
can ‘process information’ as fast as it can, and since he shows you cannot have a 
perfect memory nor perfect control, its past, present or future state can never be 
perfectly or completely depicted, characterized, known or copied. He also proved 
that no combination of computers with error correcting codes can overcome these 
limitations. Wolpert also notes the critical importance of the observer (“the liar”) 
and this connects us to the familiar conundrums of physics, math and language. 
As noted in my other articles I think that definitive comments on many relevant 
issues here (completeness, certainty, the nature of computation etc.) were made 
long ago by Ludwig Wittgenstein and here is one relevant comment of Juliet 
Floyd on Wittgenstein: 
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”He is articulating in other words a generalized form of diagonalization. The 
argument is thus generally applicable, not only to decimal expansions, but to any 
purported listing or rule-governed expression of them; it does not rely on any 
particular notational device or preferred spatial arrangements of signs. In that 
sense, Wittgenstein’s argument appeals to no picture and it is not essentially 
diagrammatical or representational, though it may be diagrammed and insofar 
as it is a logical argument, its logic may be represented formally). Like Turing’s 
arguments, it is free of a direct tie to any particular formalism. Unlike Turing’s 
arguments, it explicitly invokes the notion of a language-game and applies to 
(and presupposes) an everyday conception of the notions of rules and of the 
humans who follow them. Every line in the diagonal presentation above is 
conceived as an instruction or command, analogous to an order given to a human 
being...” The parallels to Wolpert are obvious. 
 
K and R‘s second theorem shows possible nonconvergence for Bayesian 
(probabilistic) forecasting in infinite- dimensional space. The third shows the 
impossibility of a computer perfectly forecasting an economy with agents 
knowing its forecasting program. The astute will notice that these theorems can 
be seen as versions of the liar paradox, and the fact that we are caught in 
impossibilities when we try to calculate a system that includes ourselves has been 
noted by Wolpert, Koppl, Rosser and others in these contexts and again we have 
circled back to the puzzles of physics when the observer is involved. K&R 
conclude “Thus, economic order is partly the product of something other than 
calculative rationality”. 
 
Bounded rationality is now a major field in itself, the subject of thousands of 
papers and hundreds of books. And this seemingly abstruse work of Wolpert’s 
may have implications for all rationality. Of course, one must keep in mind that 
(as Wittgenstein noted) math and logic are all syntax and no semantics and they 
have nothing to tell us until connected to our life by language (i.e., by psychology) 
and so it is easy to do this in ways that are useful (meaningful or having COS) or 
not (no clear COS). 
 
Finally, one might say that many of Wolpert’s comments are restatements of the 
idea that no program (and thus no device) can generate a sequence (or device) 
with greater complexity than it possesses. There are obvious connections to the 
classic work of Chaitin, Solomonoff, Komolgarov and Wittgenstein and to the 
notion that no program (and thus no device) can generate a sequence (or device) 
with greater complexity than it possesses. One might say this body of work 
implies atheism since there cannot be any entity more complex than the physical 
universe and from the Wittgensteinian viewpoint, ‘more complex’ is meaningless 
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(has no conditions of satisfaction, i.e., truth-maker or test). Even a ‘God’ (i.e., a 
‘device’ with limitless time/space and energy) cannot determine whether a given 
‘number’ is ‘random’ nor can find a certain way to show that a given ‘formula’, 
‘theorem’ or ‘sentence’ or ‘device’ (all these being complex language games) is 
part of a particular ‘system’. 
 
Regarding “incompleteness” or “randomness” in math, Y’s failure to mention the 
work of Gregory Chaitin is truly amazing, as he must know of his work, and 
Chaitin’s proof of the algorithmic randomness of math (of which Godel’s results 
are a corollary) and the Omega number are some of the most famous 
mathematical results in the last 50 years. 
 
A mountain of literature exists on Godel’s two “incompleteness” theorems and 
Chaitin’s more recent work, but I think that W’s writings in the 30’s and 40’s are 
definitive. Although Shanker, Mancosu, Floyd, Marion, Rodych, Gefwert, Wright 
and others have done insightful work, it is only recently that W’s uniquely 
penetrating analysis of the language games being played in mathematics have 
been clarified by Floyd (e.g., ‘Wittgenstein’s Diagonal Argument-a Variation on 
Cantor and Turing’), Berto (e.g., ‘Godel’s Paradox and Wittgenstein’s Reasons , 
and ‘Wittgenstein on Incompleteness makes Paraconsistent Sense’ and the book 
‘There’s Something about Godel ‘, and Rodych  
(e.g., Wittgenstein and Godel: the Newly Published Remarks’, ‘Misunderstanding 
Gödel : New Arguments about Wittgenstein’, ‘New Remarks by Wittgenstein’ 
and his article in the online Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy ‘Wittgenstein’s 
Philosophy of Mathematics’ ). Berto is one of the best recent philosophers, and 
those with time might wish to consult his many other articles and books including 
the volume he co-edited on paraconsistency (2013). Rodych’s work is 
indispensable, but only two of a dozen or so papers are free online with the usual 
search but it’s probably all free online if one knows where to look. 
 
Wittgenstein pointed out how in math, we are caught in more LG’s (Language 
Games) where it is not clear what “true”, “complete”, “follows from”, “provable”, 
“number”, ”infinite”, etc. mean (i.e., what are their COS or truthmakers in THIS 
context), and hence what significance to attach to ‘incompleteness’ and likewise 
for Chaitin’s “algorithmic randomness”. As Wittgenstein noted frequently, do the 
“inconsistencies” of math or the counterintuitive results of metaphysics cause any 
real problems in math, physics or life? The apparently more serious cases of 
contradictory statements –e.g., in set theory---have long been known but math 
goes on anyway. Likewise for the countless liar (self-referencing) paradoxes in 
language which Yanofsky discusses, but he does not really understand their basis, 
and fails to make clear that self-referencing is involved in the ”incompleteness” 
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and “inconsistency” (groups of complex language games) of mathematics as well. 
 
Yanofsky mentions the famous impossibility result of Brandenburger and Keisler 
(2006) for two person games (but of course not limited to “games” and like all 
these impossibility results it applies broadly to decisions of any kind) which 
shows that any belief model of a certain kind leads to contradictions. One 
interpretation of the result is that if the decision analyst’s tools (basically just 
logic) are available to the players in a game, then there are statements or beliefs 
that the players can write down or ‘think about’ but cannot actually hold. “Ann 
believes that Bob assumes that Ann believes that Bob’s assumption is wrong” 
seems unexceptionable and ‘recursion’ (another language game) has been 
assumed in argumentation, linguistics, philosophy etc., for a century at least, but 
they showed that it is impossible for Ann and Bob to assume these beliefs. And 
there is a rapidly growing body of such impossibility results for 1 or multiplayer 
decision situations (e.g., it grades into Arrow, Wolpert, Koppel and Rosser etc). 
For a good technical paper from among the avalanche on the B&K paradox, get 
Abramsky and Zvesper’s paper from arXiv which takes us back to the liar 
paradox and Cantor’s infinity (as its title notes it is about “interactive forms of 
diagonalization and self-reference”) and thus to Floyd, Rodych, Berto, 
Wittgenstein and Godel. Many of these papers quote Yanofsky’s paper “A 
universal approach to self- referential paradoxes and fixed points. Bulletin of 
Symbolic Logic, 9(3):362–386, 2003. Abramsky (a polymath who is among other 
things a pioneer in quantum computing) is a friend of Yanofsky’s and so 
Yanofsky contributes a paper to the recent Festschrift to him ‘Computation, Logic, 
Games and Quantum Foundations’ (2013). For maybe the best recent (2013) 
commentary on the BK and related paradoxes see the 165p powerpoint lecture 
free on the net by Wes Holliday and Eric Pacuit ’Ten Puzzles and Paradoxes 
about Knowledge and Belief’. For a good multi-author survey see ’Collective 
Decision Making (2010). 
 
One of the major omissions from all such books is the amazing work of polymath 
physicist and decision theorist David Wolpert, who proved some stunning 
impossibility or incompleteness theorems (1992 to 2008-see arxiv.org) on the 
limits to inference (computation) that are so general they are independent of the 
device doing the computation, and even independent of the laws of physics, so 
they apply across computers, physics, and human behavior, which he 
summarized thusly: “One cannot build a physical computer that can be assured of 
correctly processing information faster than the universe does. The results also 
mean that there cannot exist an infallible, general-purpose observation apparatus, 
and that there cannot be an infallible, general-purpose control apparatus. These 
results do not rely on systems that are inﬁnite, and/or non-classical, and/or obey 
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chaotic dynamics. They also hold even if one uses an inﬁnitely fast, inﬁnitely 
dense computer, with computational powers greater than that of a Turing 
Machine.” 
  
He also published what seems to be the first serious work on team or collective 
intelligence (COIN) which he says puts this subject on a sound scientific footing. 
Although he has published various versions of these over two decades in some of 
the most prestigious peer reviewed physics journals (e.g., Physica D 237: 257- 
81(2008)) as well as in NASA journals and has gotten news items in major science 
journals, few seem to have noticed and I have looked in dozens of recent books on 
physics, math, decision theory and computation without finding a reference. 
 
It is most unfortunate that Yanofsky and others have no awareness of Wolpert, 
since his work is the ultimate extension of computing, thinking, inference, 
incompleteness, and undecidability, which he achieves (like many proofs in 
Turing machine theory) by extending the liar paradox and Cantors 
diagonalization to include all possible universes and all beings or mechanisms 
and thus may be seen as the last word not only on computation, but on 
cosmology or even deities. He achieves this extreme generality by partitioning the 
inferring universe using worldlines (i.e., in terms of what it does and not how it 
does it) so that his mathematical proofs are independent of any particular 
physical laws or computational structures in establishing the physical limits of 
inference for past, present and future and all possible calculation, observation and 
control. He notes that even in a classical universe Laplace was wrong about being 
able to perfectly predict the future (or even perfectly depict the past or present) 
and that his impossibility results can be viewed as a “non-quantum mechanical 
uncertainty principle” (i.e., there cannot be an infallible observation or control 
device). Any universal physical device must be infinite, it can only be so at one 
moment in time, and no reality can have more than one (the “monotheism 
theorem”). 
 
Since space and time do not appear in the definition, the device can even be the 
entire universe across all time. It can be viewed as a physical analog of 
incompleteness with two inference devices rather than one self-referential device. 
As he says, “either the Hamiltonian of our universe proscribes a certain type of 
computation, or prediction complexity is unique (unlike algorithmic information 
complexity) in that there is one and only one version of it that can be applicable 
throughout our universe.” Another way to say this is that one cannot have two 
physical inference devices (computers) both capable of being asked arbitrary 
questions about the output of the other, or that the universe cannot contain a 
computer to which one can pose any arbitrary computational task, or that for any 
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pair of physical inference engines, there are always binary valued questions about 
the state of the universe that cannot even be posed to at least one of them. One 
cannot build a computer that can predict an arbitrary future condition of a 
physical system before it occurs, even if the condition is 
  
from a restricted set of tasks that can be posed to it— that is, it cannot process 
information (though this is a vexed phrase as Searle and Read and others note) 
faster than the universe. The computer and the arbitrary physical system it is 
computing do not have to be physically coupled and it holds regardless of the 
laws of physics, chaos, quantum mechanics, causality or light cones and even for 
an infinite speed of light. The inference device does not have to be spatially 
localized but can be nonlocal dynamical processes occurring across the entire 
universe. He is well aware that this puts the speculations of Wolfram, Landauer, 
Fredkin, Lloyd etc., concerning the universe as computer or the limits of 
”information processing”, in a new light (though the indices of their writings 
make no reference to him and another remarkable omission is that none of the 
above are mentioned by Yanofsky either). 
 
Wolpert says it shows that the universe cannot contain an inference device that 
can process information as fast as it can, and since he shows you cannot have a 
perfect memory nor perfect control, its past, present or future state can never be 
perfectly or completely depicted, characterized, known or copied. He also proved 
that no combination of computers with error correcting codes can overcome these 
limitations. Wolpert also notes the critical importance of the observer (“the liar”) 
and this connects us to the familiar conundrums of physics, math and language 
that concern Yanofsky. Again cf. Floyd on Wittgenstein:  ”He is articulating in 
other words a generalized form of diagonalization. The argument is thus 
generally applicable, not only to decimal expansions, but to any purported listing 
or rule-governed expression of them; it does not rely on any particular notational 
device or preferred spatial arrangements of signs. In that sense, Wittgenstein’s 
argument appeals to no picture and it is not essentially diagrammatical or 
representational, though it may be diagrammed and insofar as it is a logical 
argument, its logic may be represented formally). Like Turing’s arguments, it is 
free of a direct tie to any particular formalism. [The parallels to Wolpert are 
obvious.] Unlike Turing’s arguments, it explicitly invokes the notion of a 
language-game and applies to (and presupposes) an everyday conception of the 
notions of rules and of the humans who follow them. Every line in the diagonal 
presentation above is conceived as an instruction or command, analogous to an 
order given to a human being...” 
 
Wittgenstein’s prescient viewpoint of these issues, including his embrace of strict 
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finitism and paraconsistency, is finally spreading through math, logic and 
computer science (though rarely with any acknowledgement). Bremer has 
recently suggested the necessity of a Paraconsistent Lowenheim-Skolem Theorem. 
“Any mathematical theory presented in first order logic has a finite 
paraconsistent model.” Berto continues: “Of course strict finitism and the 
insistence on the decidability of any meaningful mathematical question go hand 
in hand. As Rodych has remarked, the intermediate Wittgenstein’s view is 
dominated by his ‘finitism and his view […] of mathematical meaningfulness as 
algorithmic decidability’ according to which ‘[only] finite logical sums and 
products (containing only decidable arithmetic predicates) are meaningful 
because they are algorithmically decidable.’” In modern terms this means they 
have public conditions of satisfaction-i.e., can be stated as a proposition that is 
true or false. And this brings us to Wittgenstein’s view that ultimately everything 
in math and logic rests on our innate (though of course extensible) ability to 
recognize a valid proof. Berto again: “Wittgenstein believed that the naïve (i.e., 
the working mathematicians) notion of proof had to be decidable, for lack of 
decidability meant to him simply lack of mathematical meaning: Wittgenstein 
believed that everything had to be decidable in mathematics…Of course one can 
speak against the decidability of the naïve notion of truth on the basis of Godel’s 
results themselves. But one may argue that, in the context, this would beg the 
question against paraconsistentists-- and against Wittgenstein too. Both 
Wittgenstein and the paraconsistentists on one side, and the followers of the 
standard view on the other, agree on the following thesis: the decidability of the 
notion of proof and its inconsistency are incompatible. But to infer from this that 
the naïve notion of proof is not decidable invokes the indispensability of 
consistency, which is exactly what Wittgenstein and the paraconsistent argument 
call into question...for as Victor Rodych has forcefully argued, the consistency of 
the relevant system is precisely what is called into question by Wittgenstein’s 
reasoning.” And so: “Therefore the Inconsistent arithmetic avoids Gödel's First 
Incompleteness Theorem. It also avoids the Second Theorem in the sense that its 
non-triviality can be established within the theory: and Tarski’s Theorem too—
including its own predicate is not a problem for an inconsistent theory “[As Priest 
noted over 20 years ago]. Prof. Rodych thinks my comments reasonably represent 
his views, but notes that the issues are quite complex and there are many 
differences between he, Berto and Floyd. 
 
And again, ‘decidability’ comes down to the ability to recognize a valid proof, 
which rests on our innate axiomatic psychology, which math and logic have in 
common with language. And this is not just a remote historical issue but is totally 
current. I have read much of Chaitin and never seen a hint that he has considered 
these matters. The work of Douglas Hofstadter also comes to mind. His Godel, 
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Escher, Bach won a Pulitzer prize and a National Book Award for Science, sold 
millions of copies and continues to get good reviews (e.g. almost 400 mostly 5 star 
reviews on Amazon to date) but he has no clue about the real issues and repeats 
the classical philosophical mistakes on nearly every page. His subsequent 
philosophical writings have not improved (he has chosen Dennett as his muse), 
but, as these views are vacuous and unconnected to real life, he continues to do 
excellent science. 
  
However once again note that “infinite”, “compute”, “information” etc., only 
have meaning in specific human contexts—that is, as Searle has emphasized, they 
are all observer relative or ascribed vs intrinsically intentional. The universe apart 
from our psychology is neither finite nor infinite and cannot compute nor process 
anything. Only in our language games do our laptop or the universe compute. 
 
However not everyone is oblivious to Wolpert. Well known econometricians 
Koppl and Rosser in their famous 2002 paper “All that I have to say has already 
crossed your mind” give three theorems on the limits to rationality, prediction 
and control in economics. The first uses Wolpert’s theorem on the limits to 
computability to show some logical limits to forecasting the future. Wolpert notes 
that it can be viewed as the physical analog of Gödel's incompleteness theorem 
and K and R say that their variant can be viewed as its social science analog, 
though Wolpert is well aware of the social implications. Since Gödel's are 
corollaries of Chaitin’s theorem showing algorithmic randomness 
(incompleteness) throughout math (which is just another of our symbolic 
systems), it seems inescapable that thinking (behavior) is full of impossible, 
random or incomplete statements and situations. Since we can view each of these 
domains as symbolic systems evolved by chance to make our psychology work, 
perhaps it should be regarded as unsurprising that they are not “complete”. For 
math, Chaitin says this ‘randomness’ (again a group of language games) shows 
there are limitless theorems that are true but unprovable—i.e., true for no reason. 
One should then be able to say that there are limitless statements that make 
perfect “grammatical” sense that do not describe actual situations attainable in 
that domain. I suggest these puzzles go away if one considers Wittgenstein’s 
views. He wrote many notes on the issue of Godel’s Theorems, and the whole of 
his work concerns the plasticity, “incompleteness” and extreme context sensitivity 
of language, math and logic, and the recent papers of Rodych, Floyd and Berto 
are the best introduction I know of to Wittgenstein’s remarks on the foundations 
of mathematics and so to philosophy. 
Koppl and Rosser‘s second theorem shows possible nonconvergence for Bayesian 
(probabilistic) forecasting in infinite- dimensional space. The third shows the 
impossibility of a computer perfectly forecasting an economy with agents 
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knowing its forecasting program. The astute will notice that these theorems can 
be seen as versions of the liar paradox and the fact that we are caught in 
impossibilities when we try to calculate a system that includes ourselves has been 
noted by Wolpert, Koppl, Rosser and others in these contexts and again we have 
circled back to the puzzles of physics when the observer is involved. K&R 
conclude “Thus, economic order is partly the product of something other than 
calculative rationality”. Bounded rationality is now a major field in itself, the 
subject of thousands of papers and hundreds of books. 
 
On p19 of his book Yanofsky says math is free of contradictions, yet as noted, it 
has been well known for over half a century that logic and math (and physics) are 
full of them—just google inconsistency in math or search it on Amazon or see the 
works of Priest, Berto or the article by Weber in the Internet Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy. W was the first to predict inconsistency or paraconsistency, and if we 
follow Berto we can interpret this as Wittgenstein’s suggestion to avoid 
incompleteness. In any event, paraconsistency is now a common feature and a 
major research program in geometry, set theory, arithmetic, analysis, logic and 
computer science. Yanofsky returns to this issue other places such as on p346 
where he says reason must be free of contradictions, but it is clear that “free of” 
has different uses and they arise frequently in everyday life but we have innate 
mechanisms to contain them. This is true because it was the case in our everyday 
life long before math and science 
 
On p347 of Yanofsky’s book, what we discovered about irrational numbers that 
gave them a meaning is that they can be given a use or clear COS in certain 
contexts and at the bottom of the page our “intuitions” about objects, places, 
times, length are not mistaken- rather we began using these words in new 
contexts where the COS of sentences in which they are used were utterly 
different. This may seem a small point to some, but I suggest it is the whole point. 
Some “particle” which can “be in two places” at once is just not an object and/or is 
not “being in places” in the same sense as a soccer ball, i.e., like so many terms its 
language games have clear COS in our mesoscopic realm but lack them (or have 
different and commonly unstated ones) in the macro or micro realms. 
 
In sum, I suggest that what appear to be scientific issues to be investigated 
factually, are often issues for philosophical treatment, and can only be understood 
by looking at the language in context, and that science and mathematics are parts 
of higher order thought (System 2 in the modern two systems framework) as 
Wittgenstein realized some 80 years ago.  
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